An Enciphering Scheme Based on a Card Shuffle by Hoang, Viet Tung et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
8.
11
76
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
1 N
ov
 20
14
An Enciphering Scheme Based on a Card Shuffle
Viet Tung Hoang1 Ben Morris2 Phillip Rogaway1
1 Dept. of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, USA
2 Dept. of Mathematics, University of California, Davis, USA
May 22, 2018
Abstract. We introduce the swap-or-not shuffle and show that the technique gives rise to a new
method to convert a pseudorandom function (PRF) into a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) (or,
alternatively, to directly build a confusion/diffusion blockcipher). We then prove that swap-or-not
has excellent quantitative security bounds, giving a Luby-Rackoff type result that ensures security
(assuming an ideal round function) to a number of adversarial queries that is nearly the size of the
construction’s domain. Swap-or-not provides a direct solution for building a small-domain cipher and
achieving format-preserving encryption, yielding the best bounds known for a practical scheme for
enciphering credit-card numbers. The analysis of swap-or-not is based on the theory of mixing times of
Markov chains.
Keywords: Blockciphers, Feistel network, Luby-Rackoff, Markov chain, PRF-to-PRP conversion, pseu-
dorandom permutations, swap-or-not.
1 Introduction
Overview. Despite the diversity of proposed blockciphers, only two approaches underlie the
construction of real-world designs: essentially everything looks like some sort of Feistel network (e.g.,
DES, FEAL, MARS, RC6) or SP-network (e.g., Rijndael, Safer, Serpent, Square). Analogously, in
the literature on constructing pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) from pseudorandom functions
(PRFs), we have provable-security analyses for Feistel variants (e.g., [13, 15, 19, 25, 28]), as well as
modes of operation (e.g., [11, 12, 25, 26]) that can again be construed as SP-networks, now on a large
domain. Perhaps there just are not that many fundamentally different ways to make a blockcipher.
Or perhaps we might have failed to notice other possibilities.
In this short paper we describe a very different way to make a blockcipher. We call it a
swap-or-not network (or cipher or shuffle). Besides introducing the construction, we evidence its
cryptographic utility. We do this by showing that swap-or-not provides the quantitatively best
mechanism known, in terms of concrete security bounds, to convert a PRF into a PRP. We also
show that swap-or-not provides a practical solution for the problem of format-preserving encryption
(FPE) on domains of troublesome size, such as enciphering credit-card numbers.
proc EKF (X) //swap-or-not
for i← 1 to r do
X ′ ← Ki ⊕X, Xˆ ← max(X,X ′)
if Fi(Xˆ) = 1 then X ← X ′
return X
Fig. 1. Cipher E = SN[r, n] encrypts X∈{0, 1}n using a
key KF naming K1, . . . ,Kr ∈{0, 1}
n and round functions
F1, . . . , Fr : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}.
Construction. Suppose we aim to encipher
n-bit strings; our message space is the set
X = {0, 1}n. Assume we will use r rounds,
and that the blockcipher’s key KF names
subkeysK1, . . . ,Kr ∈ {0, 1}n as well as round
functions F1, . . . , Fr, each of which maps n-
bits to a single bit, so Fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
Then we encipher X ∈ {0, 1}n as shown in
Fig. 1. The reason that this works, that one
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gets a permutation, is simply that X 7→ Ki ⊕X is an involution, and our round function depends
on the set {X,Ki ⊕X}. The inverse direction for swap-or-not is identical to the forward direction
shown above except for having i run from r down to 1.
Restating the algorithm in English, at each round i we pair the current value of X ∈ {0, 1}n with
a “partner” point X ′ = Ki⊕X. We either replace X by its partner or leave it alone. Which of these
two things we do is determined by applying the boolean-valued Fi to the two-element set {X,X ′}.
Actually, in order to give Fi a more conventional domain, we select a canonical representative from
{X,X ′}, say Xˆ = max(X,X ′), and apply Fi to it. Note that each plaintext maps to a ciphertext
by xoring into it some subset of the subkeys {K1, . . . ,Kr}. This might sound linear, but it most
definitely is not.
Card shuffling view. The swap-or-not construction was invented, and will be analyzed, by
regarding it as a way to shuffle a deck of cards. Seeing a blockcipher as a card shuffle enables
one to exploit a large body of mathematical techniques, these dating back to the first half of the
twentieth century. In addition, some ways to shuffle cards give rise to enciphering schemes that
cryptographers did not consider. Swap-or-not is such a case.
One can always see a card shuffle as an enciphering scheme, and vice versa. If you have some
method to shuffle N cards, this determines a corresponding way to encipher N points: place a card
at each position X ∈ [N ], where [N ] = {0, 1, . . . , N−1}; shuffle the deck; then look to see the
position where the card initially at position X ended up. Call that position the ciphertext Y for X.
The randomness used in the shuffle corresponds the cipher’s key.
The first thing needed for a card shuffle to give rise to a computationally feasible blockcipher is
that the shuffle be oblivious, an idea suggested by Moni Naor [25, p. 62], [32, p. 17]. In an oblivious
shuffle one can trace the trajectory of a card without attending to lots of other cards in the deck.
Most conventional shuffles, such as the riffle shuffle, are not oblivious. The Thorp shuffle [35] is
oblivious—and so is swap-or-not. As a shuffle, here’s how it looks.
K
$← {0, 1}n //swap-or-not as a shuffle
for each pair of positions {X,K ⊕X}
b
$←{0, 1}
if b = 1 then swap the cards
at positions X and K ⊕X
Fig. 2. Mixing a deck of N = 2n cards, each at a
position X ∈ {0, 1}n. The code shows one shuffle. For
better mixing, the shuffle is repeated r times.
Recasting swap-or-not as a way to shuffle
cards, suppose we have N cards, one at each
position X ∈ [N ], where N = 2n. To shuffle the
deck, choose a random K∈{0, 1}n and then, for
each pair of card positions X and K ⊕X, flip a
fair coin. If it lands heads, swap the cards at
the indicated positions; if it lands tails, leave
them alone. See Fig. 2. The process can be re-
peated any number r times, using independent
coins (both the K-values and the b-values) for
each shuffle.
When the swap-or-not shuffle of Fig. 2 is translated back into the language of encryption, one
recovers the swap-or-not cipher of Fig. 1; these are different views of precisely the same process.
The random pairing-up of cards specified by K for the ith shuffle corresponds to the subkey Ki.
The random bit b flipped at the shuffle’s round i for the pair {X,K ⊕X} corresponds Fi(Xˆ).
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proc EKF (X) //Generalized domain
for i← 1 to r do
X ′ ← Ki −X, Xˆ ← max(X,X ′)
if Fi(Xˆ) = 1 then X ← X ′
return X
Fig. 3. Cipher E = SN[r,N,+] encrypts X∈ [N ] using
a key KF naming K1, . . . ,Kr ∈ [N ] and round functions
F1, . . . , Fr : [N ] → {0, 1}.
Generalizing. It is useful to be a bit more
general here, working in a finite abelian group
G = ([N ],+) instead of the group ({0, 1}n,⊕)
of bit strings under xor. (For convenience, we
have assumed that the group elements are
named [N ] = {0, . . . , N − 1}.) In this way
we won’t need the number of points N in
the message space X = [N ] to be a power
of two—we’ll be able to encipher points on
any set X = [N ], just by naming a group op-
erator, say addition moduloN . For generalizing the shuffle of Fig. 2, the valueK is uniformly drawn
from [N ] rather than from {0, 1}n, and we consider the pair of positions {X,K −X} rather than
{X,K⊕X}. For the generalized cipher—see Fig. 3—the keyKF will name subkeysK1, . . . ,Kr ∈ [N ]
and round functions F1, . . . , Fr : [N ] → {0, 1}. We set X ′ ← Ki − X rather than X ′ ← Ki ⊕ X.
The inverse remains what one gets by iterating from r down to 1.
Results. As with Luby and Rackoff’s seminal paper [19], we can analyze the swap-or-not construc-
tion by regarding its constituent parts as uniformly random. Formally, let us write SN[r,N,+]: K×
[N ] → [N ] for the blockcipher E specified in Fig. 3 that is swap-or-not with r rounds, a message
space of [N ], the indicated group operator, and where the key space names all possible subkeys
K1, . . . ,Kr ∈ [N ] and all possible round functions F1, . . . , Fr : [N ]→ {0, 1}. Thus a random key KF
for this cipher has the Ki and Fi values uniformly chosen. We define the CCA (also called the
“strong-PRP”) advantage of an adversary A attacking E by dropping it into one of two worlds. In
the first, the adversary gets an oracle for EKF (·), for a randomKF , and also an oracle for its inverse,
E−1KF (·). Alternatively, the adversary is given a uniformly random permutation π : [N ]→ [N ], along
with its inverse, π−1(·). Define
AdvccaSN[r,N,+](q) = max
A
{
Pr[AEKF (·), E
−1
KF
(·) ⇒ 1]− Pr[Aπ(·), π−1(·) ⇒ 1]
}
,
the maximum over all adversaries that ask at most q total queries. Our main result is that
AdvccaSN[r,N,+](q) ≤
8N3/2
r + 4
(
q +N
2N
)r/4+1
. (1)
Roughly said, you need r = 6 lgN rounds of swap-or-not to start to see a good bound on CCA-
security. After that, the adversary’s advantage drops off inverse exponentially in r. The summary
explanation of formula (1) just given assumes that the number of adversarial queries is capped at
q = (1− ǫ)N for some fixed ǫ > 0.
The quantitative guarantee above is far stronger than anything a balanced Feistel network can
deliver. The only remotely comparable bound we know, retaining security to N1−ǫ queries instead
of (1 − ǫ)N queries, is the Thorp shuffle [35] (or, equivalently, a maximally-unbalanced Feistel
network [24]). But the known result, establishing AdvccaE′ (q) ≤ (2q/r + 1)(4nq/N)r if one shuffles
N = 2n points for r(4n − 2) rounds [24], vanishes by the time that q ≥ N4 lgN . Numerically, the
Thorp-shuffle bounds come out much weaker for most r, q, and N . See Fig. 4 for sample graphs
comparing known bounds on balanced Feistel, the Thorp shuffle, and swap-or-not.
As a simple numerical example, swap-or-not enciphering 64-bit strings for 1200 rounds using a
random round function will yield a maximal CCA advantage of less than 10−10, even if the adversary
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FE-4 FE-6 TH-8 TH-20
SN-8
SN-10
Fig. 4. Illustration of results. The message space has N = 264 points. The graphs show established upper bounds
on CCA advantage when the adversary asks q queries, where log2(q) labels the x-axis. Rightmost two graphs: the
new results—the swap-or-not cipher for either eight passes (512 rounds) (SN-8) or 10 (SN-10), as given by Theorem 5.
(One pass is defined as ⌈lgN⌉ rounds.) For comparison, the leftmost two graphs are for balanced Feistel, both the
classical 4-round result of Luby and Rackoff [19, 27] (LR-4) and then a six-round result of Patarin (LR-6) [29, Th. 7].
The middle two graphs are for the Thorp shuffle, either with eight passes (TH-8) or 20 (TH-20), as given by [24,
Th. 5].
can ask q = 263 queries. While the number of rounds is obviously large, no other construction can
deliver a comparable guarantee, achieving security even when q is close to N .
For a more complexity-theoretic discussion of swap-or-not, see Section 4.
proc E˜KF (T,X) //Tweakable swap-or-not
for i← 1 to r do
X ′ ← Ki −X, Xˆ ← max(X,X ′)
if Fi(T, Xˆ) = 1 then X ← X ′
return X
Fig. 4. Tweakable blockcipher E˜ = TSN[r,N,+, T ] en-
crypts X∈ [N ] under a tweak T ∈ T using a key
KF naming K1, . . . ,Kr ∈ [N ] and round functions
F1, . . . , Fr : T × [N ] → {0, 1}.
Adding tweaks. One can also turn
swap-or-not to a tweakable blockcipher [18]
by adding the tweak into the scope of the
round functions, as shown in Fig. 4. We gen-
eralize the CCA security to the tweakable
setting as follows. Consider an adversary A
attacking the tweakable blockcipher E˜. The
adversary is then dropped into one of two
worlds. In the first, the adversary gets an ora-
cle for E˜KF (·), for a random KF , and also an
oracle for its inverse, E˜−1KF (·, ·). Alternatively,
the adversary is given a family of independent, uniformly random permutations π˜ : T × [N ]→ [N ],
along with its inverse, π˜−1(·, ·). Define
Advcca
E˜
(q) = max
A
{
Pr[A E˜KF (·,·), E˜
−1
KF
(·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr[A π˜(·,·), π˜−1(·,·) ⇒ 1]
}
,
the maximum over all adversaries that ask at most q total queries. In Section 5 we recite follow-on
work [23] that shows
AdvccaTSN[r,N,+,T ](q) ≤
8N3/4√
(r + 4)
(
q +N
2N
)(r+4)/8
.
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Most prior provably-secure constructions of tweakable blockciphers, such as [18, 31] only achieve
security up to q = O(
√
N) queries. Minematsu [22] gives the first construction of tweakable block-
ciphers that goes beyond the birthday bound, but his method only admits inconveniently short
tweaks—tweak length must be smaller than lg(N)/2—and has to rekey the underlying blockci-
pher for every tweak change. Landecker, Shrimpton, and Terashima [17], and then Lampe and
Seurin [16] show how to generically lift a blockcipher E to a tweakable blockcipher E˜ with
Advcca
E˜
(q) ≤ AdvccaE (q) +
√
q(q/N)r/4, for any integer r ≥ 2, by using about r calls of E. Their
methods use r fixed keys for E, and can handle tweaks of arbitrary length. For applications of small
domains, one would instantiate E from Thorp shuffling or swap-or-not to achieve security up to
only q = O(N (1−ǫ)) queries, whereas tweakable swap-or-not works for q = O((1− ǫ)N) queries. In
addition, this instantiation is much slower than tweakable swap-or-not.
Format-preserving encryption. Swap-or-not was originally invented as a solution for format-
preserving encryption (FPE) [1, 3, 5], where it provides the best known solution, in terms of proven-
security bounds, when N is too big to spend linear time computing, yet too small for conventional
constructions to deliver desirable bounds. This landscape has not much changed with the recent
work of Stefanov and Shi [33], who, following Granboulan and Pornin [10], show how to speed up
(e.g., to Θ˜(N0.5) time) determining where a card goes in a particular N -card shuffle after spending
Θ˜(N) time at key-setup. Subsequent to our initial publication of this paper [14], Ristenpart and
Yilek [30] used swap-or-not as a building block to realize a particular cipher of N cards in Θ(lg2(N))
time. Their method was later refined by Morris and Rogaway [23] to reduce the average running
time to Θ(lg(N)) while retaining the Θ(lg2(N)) worst-case running time. For more discussion of
swap-or-not and its use in FPE, see Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Total variation distance. Let µ and ν be probability distributions on Ω. The total variation
distance between distributions µ and ν is defined as
‖µ − ν‖ = 1
2
∑
x∈Ω
|µ(x)− ν(x)| = max
S⊂Ω
{µ(S)− ν(S)} .
Blockciphers. Let E : K ×M → M be a blockcipher, meaning that K and M are finite and
each EK(·) = E(K, ·) is a permutation on M. We emphasize that K and M need not consist of
binary strings of some particular length, as is often assumed to be the case. For any blockcipher E,
we let E−1 be its inverse blockcipher.
For blockcipher E : K × M → M and adversary A the advantage of A in carrying out an
(adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) on E is
AdvccaE (A)=Pr[K
$←K:AEK(·),E−1K (·) ⇒ 1]−Pr[π $← Perm(M):Aπ(·),π−1(·) ⇒ 1].
Here Perm(M) is the set of all permutations onM. We say that A carries out an (adaptive) chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA) if it asks no queries to its second oracle. Adversary A is non-adaptive if it
asks the same queries on every run. Let AdvccaE (q) be the maximum advantage of any (adaptive)
CCA adversary against E subject to the adversary asking at most q total oracle queries. Similarly
define AdvncpaE (q) for nonadaptive CPA attacks (NCPA).
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For blockciphers F,G : K×M→M let F ◦G denote their cascade, with F ’s output fed into G’s
input; formally, F ◦G : K2 ×M→M is defined by (F ◦G)(K,K ′) = GK ′(FK(X)).
Lifting ncpa to cca security. We bound the CCA-security of a Feistel network from its
NCPA-security by using the following result of Maurer, Pietrzak, and Renner [20, Corollary 5]. It
is key to our approach, effectively letting us assume that our adversaries are of the simple, NCPA
breed. Recall that in writing F ◦G, the blockciphers are, in effect, independently keyed.
Lemma 1 (Maurer-Pietrzak-Renner) If F and G are blockciphers on the same message space
then, for any q, AdvccaF◦G−1(q) ≤ AdvncpaF (q) +AdvncpaG (q).
Tweakable blockciphers. Let E˜ : K×M×T →M be a tweakable blockcipher, meaning that
K,M, and T are finite and each EK(·, T ) = E(K, ·, T ) is a permutation on M, for every T ∈ T .
Thus, when T is a singleton, E˜ degenerates to a blockcipher. For any tweakable blockcipher E˜, we
let E˜−1 be its inverse tweakable blockcipher.
For tweakable blockcipher E˜ : K×M×T →M and adversary A the advantage of A in carrying
out an (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) on E is
Advcca
E˜
(A)=Pr[K
$←K:AE˜K(·,·),E˜−1K (·,·) ⇒ 1]−Pr[π˜ $← Perm(M,T ):Aπ˜(·,·),π˜−1(·,·) ⇒ 1].
Here Perm(M,T ) is the set of all T -indexed families of permutations on M. We say that A
carries out an (adaptive) chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) if it asks no queries to its second oracle.
AdversaryA is non-adaptive if it asks the same queries on every run. LetAdvcca
E˜
(q) be the maximum
advantage of any (adaptive) CCA adversary against E˜ subject to the adversary asking at most q
total oracle queries. Similarly define Advncpa
E˜
(q) for nonadaptive CPA attacks (NCPA).
To lift NCPA security to CCA security in the tweakable setting, we use the following result of
Lampe and Seurin [16]. For tweakable blockciphers F˜ and G˜ of the same message space and same
tweak space, define F˜ ◦ G˜ : K2 ×M× T by F˜ ◦ G˜K,K ′(X,T ) = G˜K ′(F˜K(X,T ), T ).
Lemma 2 (Lampe-Seurin) If F˜ and G˜ are tweakable blockciphers on the same message space
and tweak space then, for any q, Advcca
F˜◦ G˜−1
(q) ≤ 2
√
Advncpa
F˜
(q) + 2
√
Advncpa
G˜
(q).
3 Security of Swap-Or-Not
Fix a finite abelian group G = ([N ],+) where [N ] = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. We define the swap-or-not
shuffle SN[r,N,+] of r rounds over the elements of G. The shuffling at round t is as follows. Initially,
each of N distinct cards is at a position in the set [N ]. To shuffle during this round, chooseKt
$← [N ],
the subkey at round t. Then, for each set {X,Kt − X} with X ∈ G, choose b $←{0, 1} and then
swap the cards at positions X and Kt −X if b = 1.
Let {Wt : t ≥ 0} be the Markov chain representing the swap-or-not shuffle with N cards. More
formally, let C be a set of cardinality N , whose elements we call cards. The state space of {Wt} is
the set of bijections from C to {0, . . . , N − 1}. For a card z ∈ C, we interpret Wt(z) as the position
of card z at time t.
Let A be a deterministic adversary that makes exactly q queries. Our proof is based on an anal-
ysis of the mixing rate of the swap-or-not shuffle. However, since A makes only q ≤ N queries, we
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need only bound the rate at which some q-element subset of the cards mixes. So let z1, . . . , zq be dis-
tinct cards in C, and let Xt be the vector of positions of cards z1, . . . , zq at time t. For j in {1, . . . , q}
we write Xt(j) for the position of card zj at time t, and define Xt(1, . . . , j) = (Xt(1), . . . ,Xt(j)). We
shall call Xt the projected swap-or-not shuffle. Note that the stationary distribution of Xt, which
we denote by π, is uniform over the set of distinct q-tuples of elements from G. Equivalently, π is
the distribution of q samples without replacement from G. Let τt denote the distribution of Xt.
Theorem 3 (Rapid mixing). Consider the swap-or-not shuffle SN[r,N,+] for r,N ≥ 1, and
let q ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Fix z1, . . . , zq and let {Xt : t ≥ 0} be the corresponding projected swap-or-not
shuffle, let π be its stationary distribution, and let τt be the distribution of Xt. Then
‖τr − π‖ ≤ 2N
3/2
r + 2
(
q +N
2N
)r/2+1
.
Proof. Let τkt be the conditional distribution of Xt given the subkeys K1, . . . ,Kr. (Here we consider
K1, . . . ,Kr random variables, and we condition on the σ-algebra of these random variables.) We
will actually show that E(‖τkr −π‖) satisfies the claimed inequality. Note that since K1, . . . ,Kr are
random variables, so is τkr , and hence so is ‖τkr − π‖. This implies the theorem since τr = E(τkr )
and hence
‖τr − π‖ = ‖E(τkr − π)‖ ≤ E
(
‖τkr − π‖
)
,
by Jensen’s inequality, since for distributions µ and τ , the total variation distance ‖µ − τ‖ is half
the L1-norm of µ− τ , and the L1-norm is convex. For a distribution ν on q-tuples of Ω, define
ν(u1, . . . , uj) = Pr[Z1 = u1, . . . , Zj = uj] and
ν(uj | u1, . . . , uj−1) = Pr[Zj = uj | Z1 = u1, . . . , Zj−1 = uj−1]
where (Z1, . . . , Zq) ∼ ν. For example, τt(u1, . . . , uj) is the probability that, in the swap-or-not
shuffle, cards z1, . . . , zj land in positions u1, . . . , uj at time t, while τt(uj | u1, . . . , uj−1) is the
probability that at time t card zj is in position uj given that cards z1, . . . , zj−1 are in positions
u1, . . . , uj−1. On the other hand, π(uj | u1, . . . uj−1) is the probability that, in a uniform random
ordering, card zj is in position uj given that cards z1, . . . , zj−1 land in positions u1, . . . , uj−1.
Each of the conditional distributions τkt ( · | u1, . . . , uj−1) converges to uniform as t→∞. When
all of these distributions are “close” to uniform, then τkt will be close to π. In fact, we only need the
conditional distributions to be close “on average,” as is formalized in the following lemma, which
is easily established using coupling. For a proof, see [24, Appendix A].
Lemma 4 Fix a finite nonempty set Ω and let µ and ν be probability distributions supported on
q-tuples of elements of Ω, and suppose that (Z1, . . . , Zq) ∼ µ. Then
‖µ − ν‖ ≤
q−1∑
l=0
E
(
‖µ( · | Z1, . . . , Zℓ)− ν( · | Z1, . . . , Zℓ)‖
)
. (2)
Note that in the above lemma, since Z1, . . . , Zq are random variables (whose joint distribution is
given by µ), so is ‖µ( · | Z1, . . . , Zℓ) − ν( · | Z1, . . . , Zℓ)‖ for every ℓ < q; each summand in the
right-hand side of (2) is the expectation of one of these random variables.
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Recall that τkt is the conditional distribution of Xt given K1, . . . ,Kr. Fix ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}.
We wish to bound the expected distance between the distribution τkt ( · | Xt(1), . . . ,Xt(ℓ)) and
π( · | Xt(1), . . . ,Xt(ℓ)) (i.e., the uniform distribution on G \ {Xt(1), . . . ,Xt(ℓ)}).
For t ≥ 0, let St = G \ {Xt(1), . . . ,Xt(ℓ)}. Thus St is the set of positions that card zℓ+1
could be located in at time t, given the positions of cards z1, ..., zℓ. For a ∈ St, let pt(a) =
τkt (a | Xt(1), . . . ,Xt(ℓ)). Then we have
‖τkt ( · | Xt(1, . . . , ℓ))− π( · | Xt(1, . . . , ℓ))‖ =
1
2
∑
a∈St
|pt(a)− 1/m|, (3)
where m = |St| = N − ℓ. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality twice gives(
E
[ ∑
a∈St
|pt(a)− 1/m|
])2
≤ E
 (∑
a∈St
|pt(a)− 1/m|
)2
≤m ·E
[ ∑
a∈St
(pt(a)− 1/m)2
]
≤ N ·E
[ ∑
a∈St
(pt(a)− 1/m)2
]
. (4)
We shall prove, by induction on t, that
E
[ ∑
a∈St
(pt(a)− 1/m)2
]
≤
(
ℓ+N
2N
)t
(5)
for every t ≤ r. Then, substituting t = r to (3), (4), and (5), we have
E
(
‖τkr ( · | Xr(1, . . . , ℓ))− π( · | Xr(1, . . . , ℓ))‖
)
≤ 1
2
(
N · E
[ ∑
a∈Sr
(pr(a)− 1/m)2
])1/2
≤
√
N
2
(
ℓ+N
2N
)r/2
. (6)
Substituting this into Lemma 4 gives
E
(
‖τkr − π‖
)
≤
q−1∑
ℓ=0
E
(
‖τkr ( · | Xr(1, . . . , ℓ))− π( · | Xr(1, . . . , ℓ))‖
)
≤
q−1∑
ℓ=0
√
N
2
(
ℓ+N
2N
)r/2
≤ N3/2
∫ q/2N
0
(1/2 + x)r/2dx ≤ 2N
3/2
r + 2
(
q +N
2N
)r/2+1
.
We now verify equation (5). First, consider the base case t = 0. Since the initial positions of
the cards are deterministic,
E
[∑
a∈S0
(p0(a)− 1/m)2
]
= (1− 1/m)2 + (m− 1) · (0− 1/m)2 = 1− 1/m < 1 .
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Now suppose that equation (5) holds for t. We prove that it also holds for t + 1. Define st =∑
a∈St
(pt(a)− 1/m)2. It is sufficient to show that
E(st+1 | st) =
(
ℓ+N
2N
)
st. (7)
Define f : St → St+1 by
f(a) =
{
a if a ∈ St+1;
Kt+1 − a otherwise.
Note that f is a bijection from St to St+1: it sends St to St+1 because if a ∈ St then either a or
Kt+1 − a must be in St+1, and it has an inverse f−1 : St+1 → St defined by
f−1(b) =
{
b if b ∈ St;
Kt+1 − b otherwise.
Furthermore, note that
pt+1(f(a)) =
{
pt(a) if Kt+1 − a /∈ St;
1
2pt(a) +
1
2pt(Kt+1 − a) otherwise.
Since Kt+1 is independent of the process up to time t, we have Pr[Kt+1 − a = y | st] = 1/N for
every y ∈ G. Hence, since |St| = m, conditioning on the value of Kt+1 − a gives
E
([
pt+1(f(a))− 1m
]2
| st
)
=
ℓ
N
(
pt(a)− 1m
)2
+
1
N
∑
y∈St
[pt(a) + pt(y)
2
− 1m
]2
. (8)
The sum can be rewritten as∑
y∈St
1
4
[
(pt(y)− 1/m) + (pt(a)− 1/m)
]2
=14
∑
y∈St
(pt(y)−1/m)2 + 12 (pt(a)−1/m)
∑
y∈St
(pt(y)−1/m) + 14
∑
y∈St
(pt(a)− 1/m)2
=14st +
m
4 (pt(a)− 1/m)2 ,
since
∑
y∈St
(pt(y)− 1/m) = 0. Combining this with (8) gives
E
([
pt+1(f(a))− 1/m
]2
| st
)
=
st
4N
+
4ℓ+m
4N
(pt(a)− 1/m)2 . (9)
Note that
E(st+1 | st) =
∑
b∈St+1
E
([
pt+1(b)− 1/m
]2
| st
)
=
∑
a∈St
E
([
pt+1(f(a))− 1/m
]2
| st
)
.
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Evaluating each term in the sum using (9) gives
E(st+1 | st) = mst
4N
+
4ℓ+m
4N
∑
a∈St
(pt(a)− 1/m)2
=
mst
4N
+
(4ℓ+m)st
4N
=
ℓ+N
2N
st,
where the last line holds because m + ℓ = N . It follows that E(st+1 | st) =
(
ℓ+N
2N
)
st, which
verifies (7) and hence (5). This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
CCA-security. Observe that if E = SN[r,N,+] for some abelian group G = ([N ],+) then E−1
is also SN[r,N,+]. Employing Lemma 1 we conclude our main theorem.
Theorem 5. Let E = SN[2r,N,+]. Then AdvccaE (q) ≤
4N3/2
r + 2
(
q +N
2N
)r/2+1
.
4 Complexity-Theoretic Interpretation
While Theorem 5 is information-theoretic, it should be clear that the result applies to the complexity-
theoretic setting too, in exactly the same manner as Luby-Rackoff [19] and its successors. Namely,
from a PRF F : K × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} and a number n, define n-bit round functions Fi(X) whose
jth bit is F (〈i, j, n,X〉). Also define n-bit round keys Ki whose jth bit is F (〈i, j, n〉). Using these
components, apply the swap-or-not construction for, say, r = 7n rounds, yielding a PRP E on n
bits. Translating the information-theoretic result into this setting, the PRP-security of E is the
PRF-security of F minus a term that remains negligible until q = (1 − ǫ)2n adversarial queries,
for any ǫ > 0. That is, from the asymptotic point of view, the swap-or-not construction preserves
essentially all of a PRF’s security in the constructed PRP.
We emphasize that our security results only cover the (strong) PRP notion of security. An inter-
esting question we leave open is whether the swap-or-not cipher is indifferentiable from a random
permutation [21]. Following Coron, Patarin, and Seurin [6], Holenstein, Ku¨nzler, and Tessaro show
that the 14-round Feistel construction is indifferentiable from a random permutation [13]. But their
proof is complex and delivers very poor concrete-security bounds. It would be desirable to have a
construction supporting a simpler proof with better bounds.
5 Incorporating Tweaks
NCPA security. Subsequent to our initial publication of the current work [14], Morris and
Rogaway [23] showed that tweakable swap-or-not is a good tweakable blockcipher.
Theorem 6 ([23]). Let E˜ = TSN[r,N,+,T ]. Then Advncpa
E˜
(q) ≤ 2N
3/2
r + 2
(
q +N
2N
)r/2+1
.
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Handling long tweaks efficiently. The construction in Fig. 4 will be slow for very long
tweaks. We can improve the speed by using a PRF H : K × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}128. A key KF names
K1, . . . ,Kr ∈ [N ], round functions F1, . . . , Fr : [N ] × [M ] → {0, 1}, and a key K ∈ K. At each
round, instead of computing Fi(T, Xˆ), we’ll use Fi(HK(T ), Xˆ). For small and moderate domains
(N ≤ 2128), this construction will use at most two AES calls per round—the preprocessing cost of
HK(T ) is discounted.
CCA security. Observe that if E˜ = TSN[r,N,+,T ] for some abelian group G = ([N ],+) then
E˜−1 is also TSN[r,N,+,T ]. Employing Lemma 2 we conclude the following.
Theorem 7. Let E˜ = TSN[2r,N,+,T ]. Then Advcca
E˜
(q) ≤ 8N
3/4
√
2r + 4
(
q +N
2N
)(r+2)/4
.
6 Format-Preserving Encryption
In the format-preserving encryption (FPE) problem, one wants to encipher on an arbitrary set X ,
often X = [N ] for some number N . Usually constructions are sought that start from a conventional
blockcipher, like AES. The problem has attracted increasing interest [1–5, 8, 10, 24, 33, 34, 37], and
is the subject of ongoing standardization work by NIST and the IEEE.
When N is sufficiently small that one can afford Ω˜(N)-time to encrypt, provably good solutions
are easy, by directly realizing a random shuffle [3]. And whenN is sufficiently large that no adversary
could ask anything near N1/2 queries, nice solutions are again easy, using standard cryptographic
constructions like multi-round Feistel. But for intermediate-size domains, like those with 230–260
points, the bounds associated to well-known construction are disappointing, even if known attacks
are not remotely feasible, and spending time proportional to the domain size, even in key-setup
phase, is not attractive.
With these problematic-size domains in mind, suppose we use swap-or-not to encipher 9-digit
social security numbers (N ≈ 230). Employing Theorem 5, if we use 340 rounds we are guaranteed a
maximal CCA advantage of less than 10−10 even if the adversary can ask q = 108 queries. Similarly,
suppose we use swap-or-not to encipher 16-digit credit cards (N ≈253). If we use 500 rounds we are
guaranteed a maximal CCA advantage of less than 10−10 even if the adversary can ask q = 1015
queries. (Of course these numbers assume random round functions; if one bases the construction on
AES, say, one will have to add in a term for its insecurity.) The round counts are obviously high, yet
the rounds are fast and the guarantees are strong. (We note too that, at least for the binary-string
setting and AES as a starting point, there are tricks to reduce the number of blockcipher calls by a
factor of five, as shown in prior work [24]. But this is probably not helpful in the presence of good
AES support, as with recent Intel processors.)
A very different approach to small-domain FPE is taken by Granboulan and Pornin [10], who
show how to realize a particular shuffle on N cards in O(lg3N) encryption time and O(lgN)
space. But the method seems to be impractical, requiring extended-precision arithmetic to sample
from a hypergeometric distribution. Stefanov and Shi go on to show how to exploit preprocessing
to realize a different N -card shuffle [33]. Their method is applicable when the key-setup cost of
Θ˜(N) is feasible, as is key storage and per-message encryption cost of Θ˜(N1/2). Near or beyond
N ≈ 230, these assumptions seem unlikely to hold in most settings. That said, the approach allows an
adversary to query all N points, whereas the shuffle of this paper has only been proven to withstand
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(1− ǫ)N queries. (We conjecture that swap-or-not works well for N queries and reasonable r—that
its mixing time is fast—but no such result is proven here.)
Subsequent to our work initial work [14], Ristenpart and Yilek [30] used swap-or-not to replace
the expensive hypergeometric samplings in Granboulan and Pornin’s construction [10]. Not only
does this cheapen the design but also reduces the number of rounds from Θ(lg3(N)) to Θ(lg2(N)).
Morris and Rogaway [23] refined this method so that the number of round, on the average case, is
only Θ(lg(N)), but the worst-case remains Θ(lg2(N)).
7 Confusion/Diffusion Ciphers
Swap-or-not can also be construed as an approach for making a confusion/diffusion blockcipher.
In doing this one would instantiate round functions Fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} by a fast, concrete con-
struction. Choosing a good instantiation for Fi is tricky. In the proceedings version of this paper
[14] we suggested that a simple, plausible instantiation was to have Fi be specified by an n-bit
string Li and let Fi(Xˆ) = Li ⊙ Xˆ be the inner-product of Li and Xˆ. Almost immediately, both
Henri Gilbert and Serge Vaudenay pointed out that this function being linear would result in the
entire construction being trivially breakable [9, 36]. We leave it as a problem for cryptanalysts to
investigate what (nonlinear) choices of Fi might work well, and how large r needs to be for them.
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